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Introduction
The Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) is an emerging 
space-faring nation seeking to expand its space capabilities 
in the realms of science, communications, commerce, and 
national security affairs. The country has passed three important 
space milestones: the launch of Korea’s first satellite, Kitsat-1 
(Uribyŏl-1) on 10 August 1992; manned space flight by Korea’s 
first astronaut, Yi So-yeon (Yi So-yŏn), on 8 April 2008; and the 
successful satellite launch with an indigenous Naro (KSLV-1) 
space launch vehicle (SLV) on 30 January 2013.
Korea now has ambitious plans to develop powerful space 
launchers, advanced satellites, lunar probes, and deep space 
exploration capabilities. Seoul’s space ambitions partially have 
been driven by an inter-Korean space rivalry,1 but the two 
Korean space programs have significant differences. This paper 
first will explain the legal and institutional foundations of the 
ROK space program before turning to the development of space 
launch vehicles, satellites, and deep space probes. The paper will 
explore ROK plans for space applications and space security, as 
well as the possibilities for international competition, conflict, 
and cooperation in outer space.
International and Domestic Legal Framework
The ROK is a signatory to four of the five United Nations space 
treaties including the Outer Space Treaty,2 the Rescue Agreement,3 
the Liability Convention,4 and the Registration Convention.5 
However, Seoul has not signed the Moon Agreement.6 The ROK 
is a member of most relevant international space institutions 
and conventions, and Seoul recently has been an active member 
of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
(COPUOS). Seoul joined the Missile Technology Control Regime 
(MTCR)7 in 2001, and subscribes to the International Code of 
Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC).8 Seoul also 
became a member of the Convention Relating to the Distribution 
of Programme-Carrying Signals Transmitted by Satellite (Brussels 
Convention) in March 2012.9
In contrast, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK 
or North Korea) has signed the Outer Space Treaty and the 
Registration Convention, but has not signed the Rescue 
Agreement, the Liability Convention, or the Moon Agreement. 
Pyongyang is a member of the Agreement on the Establishment of 
the Intersputnik International System and Organization of Space 
Communications.10 Both Koreas are members of the Agreement 
Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite 
Organization (ITSO),11 the Convention on the International 
Mobile Satellite Organization (IMSO),12 and the International 
Telecommunication Constitution and Convention (ITU).13
The ROK space program is regulated directly and indirectly by a 
number of domestic statutes and executive orders such as the 
Space Damage Compensation Act, the Civil-military Compatible 
Technology Project Promotion Act, and the Defense Industry Act. 
However, the Aerospace Industry Development Promotion Act 
and the Space Development Promotion Act are the primary legal 
instruments governing ROK space activities. These acts provide 
the basis for institutional structures and lines of authority and 
responsibilities. The first clause of the Space Development 
Promotion Act stipulates that “the objective of the law is to 
promote the systemic development of space for peaceful 
purposes, and to develop space probes to provide national 
security and the sound development of the civilian economy 
and to improve the standard of living.” In general, ROK domestic 
space law includes an element of import-substitution industrial 
policy and grants the president broad authority or discretion in 
several aspects.14
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Origins of the ROK Space Program  
and Institutional Framework
The ROK government’s first satellite development plan was 
unveiled on 11 November 1981 as part of the telecommunications 
plan in the country’s Fifth Five-Year Plan for Economic and 
Social Development. The government was motivated to provide 
television broadcasts to remote areas while realizing that 
greater telecommunications infrastructure would be required 
for the 1988 Seoul Summer Olympics.15 The vice minister of 
telecommunications was appointed to lead a 10-member 
committee of government officials and private researchers to 
assess the possibilities for a ROK space program. The committee 
commissioned two studies, one by the Electronics and 
Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI) and another by 
the Korea Industrial Development Institute (KID).16
The two institutes concluded that the timing was premature and it 
would not be economical due to insufficient demand. Therefore, 
in February 1982, President Chun Doo-hwan (Chŏn Du-hwan) 
issued a directive to postpone national space development and to 
reconsider launching a space program in the 1990s.17 In January 
1985, the Ministry of Science and Technology released a 10-year 
space development plan, and in December 1987, the Aerospace 
Industry Development and Promotion Act was enacted (and since 
revised) to provide the legal foundation for the establishment 
of the Korea Aerospace Research Institute (KARI).18 Momentum 
for the space program began one month before the December 
1987 presidential election when candidate Roh Tae-woo 
(No T’ae-u) pledged to implement a plan to acquire and develop 
satellites for telecommunications and broadcasting.19 Following 
Roh’s election, the government drafted a plan in August 1988 
to acquire telecommunications and broadcasting satellites; the 
president approved the plan in April 1989 and the ROK space 
program began to take form.20
The Korea Aerospace Research Institute (KARI) was established 
in October 1989 and initially was affiliated with the Korea 
Institute of Machinery and Materials (KIMM) before becoming 
completely independent in November 1996.21 KARI’s parent 
ministry is the Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning 
(미래창조과학부), and KARI is responsible for the development of 
aerospace technologies related to space launch vehicles, satellites, 
and unmanned aerial vehicles. KARI has six subordinate research 
centers, and it also manages the Naro Space Center satellite 
launching facility.22 Furthermore, there are preliminary plans 
to establish more R&D centers and work teams under KARI in 
accordance with the “Medium- and Long-term Space Development 
Plan,”23 and presidential directives that resulted from the Korea 
National Space Committee’s consultative meetings.24
Since KARI’s establishment, growth in its budget and human 
resources has expanded significantly, but the ROK’s space budget 
is small compared to that of other space powers. In 2012, KARI’s 
budget was $194 million or about 0.017 percent of GDP, the 
lowest among the space-faring nations.
Table 1. National Space Budgets 
 (Units: US$ million; percent of GDP)
U.S. Russia France Germany Italy UK Japan India China ROK
42,689 8,597 1,742 623 609 341 3,699 1,259 3,432 194
0.283 0.440 0.108 0.048 0.049 0.027 0.062 0.065 0.042 0.017
Source: “우주개발 중장기 계획,” 2013년, 11월.
Despite low budget figures compared to those of other nations, 
Korean citizens tend to view the space budget as high.25 The ROK 
government provides multi-year funding for long-term projects, 
but the budget is subject to review every year; budgets may be 
increased or decreased depending on the circumstances. Projects 
along with funding and resource requirements are submitted 
to the Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning (MSIFP) for 
Table 2. KARI Annual Budget (Units: years; million wŏn)
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Budget 9,095 10,363 9,206 10,091 32,124 40,592 59,644 85,827 78,272
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Budget 72,562 69,758 89,530 121,424 153,700 174,200 220,300 317,959 348,000
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Budget 363,000 325,000 365,500 274,837 295,708 392,356 450,316
Source: KARI data.
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review. ROK law stipulates that any government project over 
₩50 billion (about $50 million) must be subjected to a feasibility 
study for approval. In KARI’s case, the MSIFP delegates the 
review to the Korea Institute of Science & Technology Evaluation 
and Planning (KISTEP), and if approved, the MSIFP submits the 
KARI project budgets and total budget to the Ministry of Strategy 
and Finance for incorporation into the national budget.26 The 
executive branch then submits the budget to the National 
Assembly for approval. Because space projects are expensive, 
competitors for government funding often demand reductions 
since the expenditures can appear to lavish in comparison. 
Nevertheless, KARI views the Park Geun-hye government and 
the former Lee Myung-bak as being quite supportive of the 
space program.27
Over the last three years, the government has begun to provide 
funding for R&D by private firms.28 In particular, the govern-
ment is trying to foster an expansion of the private sector in the 
realm of satellite applications under its Satellite Information 3.0 
(위성정보 3.0) program, which will be explained below.
 
Figure 1. Growth of KARI Personnel
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The Space Development Promotion Act stipulates that the 
government must draft a “Medium- and Long-term Space 
Development Plan” (or “Space Development Plan” for brevity) 
every five years that addresses or explains policies, objectives, 
strategies, promotion plans, required funds and resources, the 
development of human resources, international cooperation, 
the promotion of space industries, the use and management of 
spacecraft, applied results from research, and other items as 
decreed by the president. The act also requires the establishment 
of a national space committee that serves directly under 
the president.29 The committee can have up to 15 members 
and is chaired by the Minister of Science, ICT and Future 
Planning, but otherwise presidential discretion determines the 
committee’s constitution.30
The Korea National Space Committee (KNSC; 국가우주위원회) 
oversees the inter-agency production of the space development 
plan, and the committee subsequently is responsible for drafting 
policies and procedures for implementation of the plan. The 
current plan was released in November 2013, and the KNSC 
convened its seventh meeting on 30 May 2014 to discuss its 
realization.31 At his meeting, the KNSC released two planning 
documents outlining the details of the government’s space 
policy objectives and the strategies to achieve them.
Rockets, Missiles and Space Launch Vehicles
South Korea’s development of rockets and missiles originated 
with the military’s weapons modernization program—codenamed 
the Yulgok Project—in the 1970s. In December 1971, President 
Park Chung-hee (Park Chŏng-hŭi) issued a directive to develop 
a ballistic missile with a range of 200km, sufficient to strike 
Pyongyang from ROK territory, by 1975. The extreme time 
constraint pushed ROK engineers to reverse-engineer the Nike-
Hercules, an American surface-to-air missile with a secondary 
surface-to-surface role that had been deployed with U.S. Forces 
Korea. The result was the Paekkom (백곰), which was flight-tested 
in 1978. However, the ROK was heavily dependent upon the U.S. 
for technology and components,32 and Washington insisted that 
Seoul enter into a bilateral military agreement in 1979 to limit 
the range of ROK ballistic missile to 180km in exchange for U.S. 
technical assistance.33 This bilateral agreement later became 
an impediment to the ROK’s efforts to extend the ranges of its 
ballistic missiles and to develop space launch vehicles.
KARI began developing rockets in 1990, successfully launching 
the solid-fuel KSR-I sounding rocket in June and September 1993, 
and the solid-fuel two-stage KSR-II in July 1997 and June 1998. 
The liquid-fuel single-stage KSR-III, the final sounding rocket in 
the series, was flight tested in November 2002 as KARI embarked 
upon the development of its first SLV. After several delays due 
to budget constraints and unanticipated barriers to receiving 
technology transfers, KARI turned to Russia’s Khrunichev State 
Space Research and Production Center in 2004 to establish a 
joint SLV project.34 An agreement was announced in January 
2005 that provided for the development of the two-stage 
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KSLV-I (Naro-1) based on the Russian Angara booster. Under the 
bilateral agreement, the Russian team built the liquid-fuel first 
stage and KARI built the solid-fuel second stage with Russian 
technical assistance.35
Three launches of the Naro-1 SLV were conducted from the Naro 
Space Center in South Jeolla (Ch’ŏlla) Province. The first two 
launches in August 2009 and June 2010 failed,36 but the third 
and final launch on 30 January 2013 was a success, placing the 
Science and Technology Satellite 2C, or Naro Science Satellite 
(나로과학위성), into low earth orbit.37 KARI officially began 
developing the KSLV-II in 2010, but in 2008 the government 
already was commissioning SLV-related research projects at the 
nation’s top engineering schools to support the development of 
SLVs and other space hardware.38
The three-stage KSLV-II is being built without foreign technical 
assistance, and it is designed to launch 1.5-ton satellites into 
low-earth orbit (600-800km).39 The original target date for the 
first launch was 2020-2021, but that has been moved up to 2019. 
The first stage is liquid-fueled and has four clustered engines 
producing 75 tons of thrust each, while the second and third 
stages each have one of these engines. KARI plans to conduct 
the first flight test with only a modified first stage configured 
with one engine in 2017. In 2019, KARI intends to launch the 
complete three-stage system, probably with a dummy payload 
before launching a functioning satellite in 2020.40 The total 
development cost of the KSLV-II is estimated to be about ₩1.957 
trillion (or about $1.9 billion).41
By the end of the next decade, KARI plans to have used the 
KSLV-II to launch 23 next-generation medium satellites (14 single 
launches; nine launches with dual payloads); four next-generation 
micro-satellites (three single launches; one dual payload); two 
multi-purpose satellites; as well as an unmanned lunar orbiter 
and an unmanned lunar landing craft. KARI seeks to provide 
space launch services for seven foreign satellites by around 2025, 
just as KARI intends to turn towards development of a new SLV 
with a launch capacity of 3.0-tons.42 KARI also intends to launch a 
lunar orbiter and a lunar landing mission with the KSLV-II, but the 
Park Geun-hye government currently is discussing the issue to 
determine whether it will provide the funding and resources for 
the lunar landing mission, which would take place around 2025, 
or long passed President Park’s tenure.43
To secure government support for space projects, KARI generally 
needs to demonstrate the economic feasibility and benefits. 
International cooperation can help justify KARI’s space endeavors 
since collaborative projects already have foreign validation. For 
example, KARI and the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) have agreed to cooperate in NASA’s 
International Lunar Network (ILN) initiative,44 and KARI had 
planned to utilize the KSLV-II to launch payloads to the moon’s 
surface in support of the project. This provided a strong rationale 
for KARI to pursue or even accelerate the KSLV-II program, but 
in February 2014 NASA told KARI that it would not permit KSLV-
II launches for the ILN. KARI officials were very surprised at 
NASA’s refusal to accept KSLV-II launch support, apparently for 
nonproliferation reasons and supposed opposition from the U.S. 
State Department.45 Nevertheless, the ROK has no intention of 
suspending the KSLV-II program. It will continue but the setback 
with the ILN project could delay completion of the KSLV-II and 
the ROK’s subsequent launch schedule if the Park government 
decides to slow down funding.46
The ROK also intends to move forward with the development of 
more powerful boosters to expand ROK capacity and autonomy 
in space. According to the 2013 Space Development Plan, KARI 
will begin development of the KSLV-III around 2027. This launcher 
will have the capacity to place a 3-ton payload into mid-level 
orbit (20,000 km), and smaller payloads into geosynchronous 
orbit (36,000 km). The ROK intends to enter the market for space 
launch services with the KSLV-II, and then start developing a 
larger SLV around 2033. To build the KSLV-III, KARI will develop 
an improved 75-ton thrust engine and solid-fuel boosters.47 With 
the development of Korea’s fourth generation SLV, KARI intends 
to transfer satellite launch services to the private sector while 
focusing on projects such as deep space exploration and a space 
station, most likely with international partners. To continue its 
SLV development projects, the ROK will seek to acquire foreign 
technologies and conduct joint research in the following areas: 
high-performance, multi-stage combustion cycle engines; engine 
control; methane engines; and hydrogen engines.48
The Naro Space Center
The Naro Space Center is located on Outer Naro Island, on 
the southwestern coast of South Jeolla (Ch’ŏlla) Province. 
Work on the center began in 2000 and ground was broken 
for construction in August 2003.49 Russia’s Khrunichev State 
Research and Production Space Center, provided technical 
assistance in building the center, but the project was delayed.50 
The space center was completed in June 2009 at a cost of ₩312.4 
billion (about $300 million)51 and now the facility is undergoing 
expansion (as explained below).
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Three launches of the Naro-1 (KSLV-I) SLV were conducted at 
the site, and much of the design and development work for new 
SLVs will be done at the expanded space center. The geographic 
location enables launches towards the south to place satellites 
into polar orbits;52 however, rockets launched directly eastward 
would pass very near Hiroshima and directly over Osaka, which 
probably would bring strong protests from Japan. According to 
the 2013 Space Development Plan, expansion of the Naro Space 
Center will continue until 2040 in order to launch larger and more 
powerful rockets, including the fourth-generation KSLV slated for 
development around 2040.53
The expansion of the Naro Space Center consists of three main 
parts: facilities for developing and testing new rocket engines; 
the pads and launch tower facilities for SLV launches; and the 
tracking, control and support facilities onsite and offsite. For 
SLV development, KARI has been building 10 testing facilities for 
rocket engines including facilities for liquid-fuel engine static test 
firings and turbo pump testing. The total cost of these facilities is 
₩440 billion (about $430 million), or about 23 percent of the total 
development costs for the KSLV-II.54 Construction of the engine 
combustion and turbo pump testing facilities was scheduled for 
completion in April 2014,55 and they should be complete and 
ready for use by the end of this year.56 If construction remains 
on schedule, the plan is to test fire a new liquid engine with 
seven tons of thrust by July 2015, and then flight-test a 75-ton-
thrust liquid engine mounted on a modified KLV-II first stage in 
December 2017.57 To certify the reliability of the new engines 
and turbo pumps, KARI will conduct about 200 engine test 
firings and about 150 turbo pump tests.58 Final adjustments or 
modifications of the engine design should be finished by March 
2018 in order to meet the KSLV-II flight-test target date in 2019.59
As KSLV-II development progresses, KARI will expand the SLV 
assembly facility and the satellite testing facility at the space 
center; KARI also will build a second launch platform. Satellite 
tracking and control facilities at the Naro Space Center and on 
Cheju Island will be expanded and upgraded. KARI also will 
explore the possibility of establishing partnerships abroad 
to build or share satellite tracking facilities. Once the ROK’s 
tracking and control infrastructure is completed and becomes 
operational in the next decade, South Korea plans to provide 
commercial space launch services in the international market.60 
If KSLV-II development succeeds according to plan, KARI plans 
to conduct two or three space launches per year from the Naro 
Space Center, and then transfer launch services to the private 
sector sometime after 2025. If the development of the KSLV-III 
and the fourth-generation launcher proceeds according to 
plan, KARI also will build a third and a fourth launch pad at the 
space center.61
Satellites and Satellite Applications
Satellites have a broad range of applications that affect our 
everyday lives, and these applications continue to expand with 
the development and integration of new technologies.
The ROK assembled its first satellite, the 50-kg microsatellite 
Kitsat-1 (Uribyŏl-1), for launch with a European Space Agency 
Ariane SLV in August 1992.62 The Satellite Technology Research 
Center (SaTReC) was established in 1989 within KAIST to develop 
satellites and to train human resources. SaTReC has moved up the 
technology ladder over the last 25 years as it has been working 
with KARI and other government agencies as well as private sector 
firms. The SaTRec Initiative, private spin-off firm established by 
former KAIST engineers, became the first ROK company to enter 
the foreign satellite market when the firm built a satellite bus for 
Malaysia’s RazakSAT satellite and another for the United Arab 
Emirates’ DubaiSat-1 for launches in 2009.63
Initially, the ROK acquired expertise and technology in the satellite 
sector before beginning its indigenous SLV program. South Korea’s 
first two attempts to orbit a satellite with the Naro-1 SLV failed 
on 25 August 2009 and on 10 June 2010, but the third attempt 
succeeded on 30 January 2013. However, the DPRK won the 
inter-Korean satellite race when the Ŭnha-3 SLV launched the 
Kwangmyŏngsŏng-3 into low earth orbit on 12 December 2012.64
In May 2013, only two months after President Park’s inauguration, 
the ROK government issued a directive to foster the growth of ROK 
firms that provide satellite imagery to the domestic market, and 
to strengthen their competitiveness in satellite service markets 
for imagery, communications, and applications. This directive 
was reflected in the Medium- and Long-term Space Development 
Plan released in November 2013.65 The government views the 
“Governments provide the greatest 
demand for satellite imagery, so 
the ROK government can support 
national firms by purchasing 
imagery products in accordance 
with its industrial policy goals.”
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space industry as a new frontier that is very important for the 
ROK’s effort to climb the technology ladder. The ROK government 
believes space development will help foster the creation and 
expansion of high-tech firms that will create more high-paying 
jobs while new services derived from space technologies will 
improve the Korean quality of life. Between now and 2017, the 
size of the Korean market for space services is expected to triple 
from ₩880 billion (about $870 million) to ₩2.8 trillion (about 
$2.7 billion).66 The number of venture capital firms working in 
the space industry is expected to grow from six to about 50, and 
the number of jobs in this sector is expected to grow five-fold to 
about 4,500.67
The ROK government’s vision of the space industry’s trajectory 
is outlined in its “First Comprehensive Plan for Satellite 
Information Applications” (제1차 위성정보 활용 종합계획).68 
The plan and the future outcome of its successful execution 
are called “Satellite Information 3.0” (위성정보 3.0). The 
satellite app dimension of the ROK space program highlights 
the benefits of space development for average citizens, and 
Satellite Information 3.0 is to receive industrial policy support 
typically received by other growth industries in the past. MSIFP 
Minister Ch’oi Mun-gi disclosed the satellite app plan during 
the seventh meeting of the Korean National Space Committee 
on 30 May 2014.69 Minister Ch’oi said that “the plan was drafted 
in order to realize the establishment of a creative economy 
(창조경제),”70 which has been one of President Park’s main 
domestic policy objectives.
Governments provide the greatest demand for satellite imagery, 
so the ROK government can support national firms by purchasing 
imagery products in accordance with its industrial policy goals. 
In the South Korean case, between 2006 and 2013, the ROK 
government obtained imagery from ROK satellites worth ₩400 
billion (about $390 million), which otherwise would have been 
purchased from foreign suppliers.71 However, between 2000 and 
2013, ROK satellite imagery sales to nongovernmental entities 
amounted to only ₩24 billion (about $23 million).72 Therefore, 
the ROK government views the nongovernmental market as 
having the greatest potential for growth.
KARI’s Satellite Information Research Center (SIRC; 
위성정보연구소) currently maintains a satellite imagery database 
and network for ROK government customers. The center has 
79 staff divided into two offices and seven teams.73 The SIRC 
collects the imagery data and processes it into data packages 
according to government agency needs. The ROK government 
plans to make the SIRC independent from KARI within the next 
couple of years as it ramps up efforts to provide more services 
to the public. The government also plans to establish a “National 
Satellite Information Application Support Center” in 2015 to 
manage the roll out of the “Satellite Information 3.0” program.74
The SIRC will help manage the ROK national satellite collection 
effort by providing input to satellite operators regarding customer 
needs. Furthermore, the center will establish and manage a 
consolidated platform that will integrate satellite data with other 
databases so that the information will be searchable with new 
computer software. This data will be opened to the public in the 
form of new applications according to the “Satellite Information 
3.0” plan. By 2017, the number of end-users is expected to reach 
about 50,000.75
The applications that will be available under “Satellite Information 
3.0” are being provided under the acronym GOLDEN (Solution): 
Geographic information; Ocean; Land; Disaster; Environment; 
National security. The plan describes these categories as areas 
that significantly impact citizens’ quality of life, and therefore 
worthy of government support. ROK government agencies are 
receiving government funding to support the development 
of space-based applications with the aim of transferring these 
technologies and apps to the private sector for mass marketing.76
Table 3. ROK Government Agency Work on Satellite Applications 
 and 2014 Budgets
Government agency Applications 2014 budget
Ministry of Agriculture, 
Food and Rural Affairs
Development of technol-
ogy to create a “smart 
palm app” to monitor 
agricultural production
₩2.4 billion 
(about $2.3 million)
Ministry of Environment
Establishment of a land 
database
₩4.4 billion 
(about $4.3 million)
Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure and Transport
Creation of maps for 
areas where public 
access is restricted
₩2.0 billion 
(about $1.9 million)
Ministry of Oceans and 
Fisheries
Research into applications 
derived from a maritime 
satellite in 
geosynchronous orbit
₩2.4 billion 
(about $2.3 million)
Korea Meteorological 
Administration
Research into the 
operation of a 
meteorological satellite 
and the related apps 
technologies
₩11.2 billion 
(about $11 million)
Source: “제1차 위성정보 활용 종합계획,” 관계부처합동, 2014 년 5월, p. 20.
(The GOLDEN Solution project currently is in the planning stage, 
but the intention is to improve the government online network 
for 23 ROK government agencies first before releasing a complete 
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data platform to the public in 2017. The SIRC, in cooperation 
with IT firms, will develop software to search, access, and 
deliver data to customers in a user-friendly manner. To support 
this effort, the Korea Space Technology Promotion Association 
(KSTPA; 한국우주기술진흥협회) and its Subcommittee on 
Satellite Information Industries (위성정보산업 분과위원회) 
were established in May 2014.77 To enter foreign markets, the 
ROK government is prepared to provide Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) funds to countries in Southeast Asia and South 
America so that aid recipients will be able to purchase products 
and services from ROK suppliers in the GOLDEN Solution project.78
The industrial policy program to support the establishment and 
growth of Korean firms in accordance with the GOLDEN Solution 
project is outlined in its affiliated STAR Exploration project. 
STAR is an acronym for “SaTellite Intelligence Application for 
Renovative space business” and the project seeks to identify 
and support successful firms. In practice, the KSTPA and its 
Subcommittee on Satellite Information Industries will consult 
with the private sector and work to link established government 
satellite services with private firms. The subcommittee will 
identify successful business models and share them with the 
private sector. Next year, the KSTPA is to unveil a roadmap to 
develop and support satellite information technologies, and to 
transfer those technologies to private firms when appropriate. 
In sum, the plan is to promote strategies for the development 
of new services that integrate imagery, communications, and 
navigation data, and then support the commercialization of 
these services in domestic and international markets.79
A prime example of cooperation between the government 
and private sector to commercialize space technologies is the 
current Kompsat-3A project. KARI designed and built Kompsat-3 
(아리랑 3호), an earth observation satellite that was launched 
in May 2012 from Japan’s Tanegashima Space Center. Now KARI 
is assisting Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI; 한국항공우주산업) 
and Asia-Pacific Aerospace (AP 우주항공) build the Kompsat-3A, 
a near replica of the Kompsat-3, in an exercise that will transfer 
technologies to these firms and enable them to enter the satellite 
supplier market.80 The Ministry of Science, ICT and Future 
Planning is tasked by the president to conduct studies and to 
develop strategies for the commercialization of the space sector, 
but the ministry delegates most of the actual work to KARI for 
subsequent review by the MSIFP’s Space Policy Division. The MSIFP 
has commissioned KARI’s Policy and International Cooperation 
Division to conduct an ongoing study on the commercialization 
of space technologies. When new space policies require revised 
or new legislation and/or new presidential decrees, KARI’s Policy 
and International Cooperation Division usually drafts the text, 
which generally has been accepted with little or no change by 
the MSIFP and the presidential office.81
The “First Comprehensive Plan for Satellite Information 
Applications” also includes efforts to cultivate human resources 
and to encourage international cooperation and joint research. 
The National Satellite Information Application Support Center will 
provide internships and help connect job seekers with employers 
in the public and private sectors. In 2012, there were about 360 
people working in South Korean firms and research institutes 
in the field of satellite imagery. By 2017, South Korea will need 
about 600 specialists to work in this field. Currently, about 100 
university and graduate students per year are majoring in this 
area. To support the development of these human resources, 
Joining the Asia Space Race: South Korea’s Space Program
Table 4. Status of ROK Government Institutions Working with Satellite Imagery Applications
Entity Date of  establishment Primary functions and activities
Organizational 
structure
Number of 
personnel
2014 
budget
KARI’s Satellite Information  
Research Center December 2007
Satellite tracking and data reception;  
processing and distributing satellite imagery
Two offices;  
seven teams 79 ₩1.85 billion
Korea Meteorological Administration’s 
National Meteorological  
Satellite Center
April 2009
Draft and manage policy on meteorological 
satellites; establish foundation for  
satellite operation
Three departments 78 ₩1.11 billion
Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries’ 
Maritime Satellite Center December 2012
Manage plans for Coms (천리안) satellite; 
process satellite data; research satellite 
apps; international cooperation
Three teams 27 ₩3 billion
National Geographic Information 
Institute’s Geospatial Imagery Infor-
mation and Photogrammetry
July 2003
Establish database infrastructure for 
aircraft/satellite imagery; mapmaking; 
imagery analysis & management
One department; 
three teams 17 ₩25 billion
Source: “제1차 위성정보 활용 종합계획,” 관계부처합동, 2014 년 5월, p. 31.
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the government plans to establish the Space Specialist Education 
Center (우주전문교육센터). This center will manage a program 
to strengthen the capacity of human resources in the private 
sector, government, and research institutions.82
“Satellite Information 3.0” recommends cooperation with 
international partners such as NASA, the European Space 
Agency (ESA), international organizations, as well as academic 
and research institutions.83 For example, the ROK is a member 
of the Group on Earth Observations (GEO) and its Global 
Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS). The GEO has 
established a division of labor among participants to provide 
satellite data on specific problems, and it provides an institutional 
network whereby members can contribute their data to 
mitigate international problems.84 For example, the pooling of 
satellite data could be applicable in the search for the missing 
Malaysian Airlines flight 370 that disappeared in March 2014, or 
in the case of a large national disaster. The ROK currently has 
two tasks in the GEO: Integrated Water Information (including 
floods and droughts); and High-Impact Weather Prediction and 
Information.85 Another example of international cooperation is 
the ROK’s participation in the Sentinel Asia,86 an international 
initiative under the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) 
and the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF).87
Manned Space Flight
The ROK first began planning for a manned mission in 2001, 
seven years before Yi So-yeon (Yi So-yŏn) became the first and 
only Korean astronaut to travel to space.88 On 8 April 2008, Yi 
boarded the Soyuz TMA12 with cosmonauts Oleg Kononenko 
and Sergei Volkov to travel to the International Space Station 
(ISS) where she conducted scientific experiments and promoted 
the ROK space program.89 Yi was selected as one of two Korean 
astronauts from among 36,206 applicants in 2006.90 The other 
successful candidate, Ko San, had been chosen for the mission 
but one month prior to launch he was disqualified for having 
violated protocols at the cosmonaut training center. Ko, a 
30-year old computer scientist, obtained training documents he 
was not authorized to have and then removed the documents 
from the training center.91
At the time of her mission, Yi was 29 years old and had just 
earned her Ph.D. in engineering from the Korea Advanced 
Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST). Yi also excelled in 
athletics having received her third dan in t’aekwŏndo and having 
competed in a marathon.92 Yi was praised by ROK media and 
she was admired as a national role model, particularly by young 
Korean women. Yi officially spent a total of 10 days, one hour and 
four minutes in space, but during reentry a malfunction caused 
the Soyuz-TMA-11 space capsule to go off course on a ballistic 
trajectory. Yi and her colleagues, American Peggy Whitson and 
Russian Yuri Malenchenko, were subjected to twice the normal 
amount of G-forces during dangerous reentry that took the 
space capsule 420km away from the target landing area. Yi 
suffered trauma to her back and had to be hospitalized but she 
fully recovered.93
Despite Yi’s accomplishments, some Koreans questioned 
whether Yi’s flight was worth the price tag of ₩26 billion (about 
$25 million) even though private sponsors paid ₩20 billion of 
the cost.94 After her mission, Yi became an adjunct professor at 
KAIST and a researcher at KARI. She also made several public 
appearances and gave public lectures to promote the space 
program. But in 2013,95 controversy surrounding Yi emerged 
after it was learned that she had gone to the U.S. to enroll in 
an MBA course and was getting married to a Korean-American 
ophthalmologist on 1 August 2013. Shortly thereafter she was 
under attack by critics who suggested the investment to train 
her as an astronaut has been wasted.96 In July 2014, she sent 
her letter of resignation to KARI, effective the following month.97 
Despite media reports of resentment or disappointment over 
Yi’s life choices and resignation from KARI, Hwang Chin-young, 
director of policy and international cooperation said that Yi 
made great contributions to the ROK space program and she 
fulfilled all her responsibilities and obligations. Hwang said that 
people should not feel animosity towards her for falling in love 
and getting married.98
KARI took advantage of the opportunity for a manned mission, 
but there are no current specific plans for another. A few years 
ago there was another potential opportunity to send a Korean 
astronaut to the ISS as part of a NASA experiment on Polarimetric 
Spectral Intensity Modulation (PSIM). KARI submitted a proposal 
to participate as a partner. The science and technology of KARI’s 
proposal was accepted but the proposal lost out to a competitive 
bid. If KARI had been selected, a strong argument could have 
been made to send a ROK scientist to the ISS as a participant.99 
KARI has not abandoned the goal of manned missions, but the 
priority now is the development of SLVs, advanced satellites, and 
an unmanned lunar mission. The issue of manned space flight 
will be revisited in the future, after 2030 and the development 
of new SLVs.
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ROK Space Security Plan
As government agencies and firms deploy assets into earth orbit, 
they naturally become concerned about the vulnerability of those 
assets because they are expensive to design, develop, assemble, 
and launch into space. Plus, if they malfunction or are lost, it 
is costly to replace them. In May 2014, the ROK government 
released a 10-year (2014-2023) space security plan, literally: 
“The First Space Danger Preparation Basic Plan [Proposed]” 
(제1차 우주위험대비 기본계획[안]).100 The Park government 
created the initiative for the plan when it issued directives in May 
2013 to “make the ROK a space power with independent space 
technologies” and to “strengthen national systems for managing 
(and responding to) natural disasters.”101 The government 
began an inter-agency policy research project on space security 
in October 2013, then held inter-agency consultations and 
conducted planning research in May 2014 before the seventh 
meeting of the Korean National Space Committee.102 103
Space-Based Threats
Space-based threats or dangers pose risks to: satellites and 
spacecraft on lunar missions or deep space voyages; human beings 
on earth; and terrestrial facilities and structures. The threats 
originate from: man-made sources such as space debris or space 
weapons; natural objects originating in outer space such asteroids, 
meteors or comets; and electromagnetic pulses from solar flares. 
Every day about 100 tons of natural objects fall to earth but most 
of it burns up before reaching the earth’s surface.104 About 20-30 
satellites fall out of orbit every year, with some of them sending 
debris to the ground. Some of these satellites contain nuclear 
power sources that can release radioactive materials into the 
atmosphere and onto the earth’s surface.105
Since Sputnik-1 was launched in 1957, about 7,000 satellites 
have been placed into earth orbit, but about 3,000 of those have 
decayed and fallen back to earth. This does not include space 
debris from rockets and other pieces of man-made materials 
orbiting the earth. There are about 21,000 pieces of space 
debris measuring 10cm or more in diameter, and over 50,000 
pieces measuring over 1cm in diameter, posing a serious risk to 
satellites.106 This problem was greatly exacerbated by a Chinese 
anti-satellite interception test in January 2007,107 and by the 
collision of the Iridium-33 satellite and Russia’s Cosmos-2251 
satellite in February 2009.108
The Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) is 
an international governmental forum for coordinating activities 
related to the issue of space debris. The ROK is not a member 
yet, but the ROK is an active participant in UN Committee on 
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), which receives an 
annual report from the IADC space debris mitigation.109 National 
space agencies share data on space debris, but they do not 
share all of their data due to national security concerns. The ROK 
government seeks greater international cooperation on space 
debris, but is not satisfied with the level of data sharing. For 
example, according to the ROK government, the U.S. Joint Space 
Operations Center (JSpOC) only shares data on about 40 percent 
of the objects it tracks in earth orbit due to the sensitivity of 
U.S. reconnaissance satellite orbits110 and the likely desire to 
protect sources and methods that constitute the U.S. satellite 
tracking capability. The result is that Seoul has decided to deploy 
advanced monitoring and tracking assets to address its space 
security concerns.
The ROK government’s awareness and concerns about space 
security were elevated by these recent events: a large meteor 
exploding over Chelyabinsk, Russia in February 2013;111 the EU 
satellite GOCE falling out of orbit in November 2013;112 and 
meteorites striking Korea in March 2014.113 These events may 
have accelerated the unveiling of the space security plan in May 
2014, but the issue already was on the government’s radar screen.
In December 2010, the ROK government drafted the “Space 
Fragment Collision Response Manual” to protect its satellites.114 
Currently, the Korea Astronomy and Space Science Institute 
(KASI; 한국천문연구원) has been tracking space debris and 
satellites that could threaten ROK satellites.115 In November 
2013, the ROK government drafted the “Standard Manual 
for Crisis Management [in the case of] Space Debris Impact” 
(or Space Debris Impact Manual).116 In 2013, when the ESA’s 
GOCE satellite (Gravity field and steady-state Ocean Circulation 
Explorer) was falling out of orbit,117 the ROK government formed 
an inter-agency monitoring team consisting of personnel from 
what then was called the Ministry of Education and Science and 
Technology, KASI, KARI, and the ROK Air Force.118
The ROK government’s sense of space insecurity resulted in the 
10-year space security plan that will have important implications 
for legal and institutional frameworks, budgets and resource 
allocation, and the U.S.-ROK alliance relationship. The space 
security plan stipulates that two monitoring systems will be 
developed and deployed by 2024: one for tracking and monitoring 
space debris that could threaten ROK space assets; and another 
for monitoring and tracking objects that could strike ROK territory.
The government is still discussing the institutional arrangements 
and necessary changes to legislation and presidential decrees 
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to implement the plan. The aim is to revise the legal framework 
by the end of this year, and to establish the institutional 
structures in 2015.119 According to the plan, the government will 
establish the Space Danger [Threat] Monitoring Center (SDMC; 
우주위험감시센터) to cooperate with international partners and 
coordinate with domestic institutions to integrate surveillance 
and tracking data, conduct threat analysis, and provide reports 
to senior policymakers and government responders.120
The SDMC will analyze the data to assess the likelihood of space 
objects falling on ROK territory, as well as the likelihood of objects 
colliding with ROK satellites in outer space.121 In the case of a 
possible satellite collision in earth orbit, the center will notify 
KARI so it can direct the satellite to take evasive maneuvers. And 
in the case of a possible surface strike on ROK territory, the SDMC 
will provide early warning and other information to the ROK 
government so that it can mobilize national crisis management 
institutions and natural disaster responders.122
The goal is to develop and roll out a system between 2018 and 
2023 with the capability to track, monitor, and assess dangerous 
space objects in orbit. Initially, the system will focus on large 
natural objects and satellites over one ton. The plan calls for 
the deployment of five optical cameras around the North Pole 
and high latitude areas,123 and the installation of 5X5 arrayed 
radar systems in the ROK by 2023. The system also will include 
the installation of five Omni-Directional Weapon Locating 
Radar (OWL-Net) systems at overseas locations.124 The goal is 
to develop a system with precision tracking radars and large-
aperture electronic optical equipment for tracking objects 10 cm 
in diameter by 2020, and one centimeter in diameter by 2040.125
The second system will focus on objects that could fall from 
deep outer space or earth orbit and strike ROK territory. The 
subsystems and hardware in each of these arrangements are 
slightly different because they monitor different things traveling 
different trajectories and areas. The surface strike early warning 
system will have a network of 25 detection and surveillance 
facilities that will be deployed in the ROK by 2020. The system 
also will include five optical telescopes installed in the ROK 
and abroad by 2023 to monitor the horizon and calculate the 
expected orbits of objects. For more precise tracking data, the 
system will include radars and 2-meter optical surveillance 
telescopes that will be installed by 2023 in the ROK and abroad. 
The goal is to deploy a network and system by 2023 that will have 
the capability to determine the trajectory and expected impact 
location of asteroids 50 meters in diameter.
The government assessment is that it currently has the equivalent 
of 30 percent of the U.S. space tracking capability, but the goal 
to improve to 80 percent of the U.S. benchmark by 2025, and to 
90 percent by 2035.126 As the ROK acquires a more sophisticated 
capability to track man-made and natural objects in space, the 
government believes this will enhance Seoul’s data-sharing 
opportunities with other friendly space powers. The integration 
of foreign data into ROK databases should improve ROK analysis, 
but the average citizen probably greatly overestimates the ROK’s 
current and future capabilities. The systems will not be perfect, 
but their symbolism provides politicians and bureaucrats with an 
opportunity to demonstrate to citizens that they are upholding 
their responsibilities to protect the public.127
It is expensive to deploy these monitoring and surveillance 
systems, so when considering their costs, imperfections, and 
the probability of space objects striking ROK territory, questions 
naturally emerge regarding dual-use applications and integration 
into air defense and missile defense systems. International 
treaties and domestic law restrict the ROK to peaceful uses of 
outer space; however, land-based, sea-based and space-based 
early detection and tracking systems that feed data into missile 
defense systems do not violate international or ROK domestic 
space law. Nevertheless, these systems as they might relate 
to ROK missile defense plans and future deployments could 
generate significant controversy because of opposition from 
China in particular, but also from Russia and the DPRK.
The ROK government, whether led by the ruling party or 
opposition party, seeks to maintain good relations with China. 
The bilateral relationship is important because of deep economic 
ties and Seoul’s desire to obtain Beijing’s cooperation in managing 
DPRK-related problems or challenges. Therefore, the ROK is 
reluctant to alienate China out of the fear that Beijing could be 
less than cooperative in the case of a crisis with the DPRK, and 
Beijing frequently has expressed strong opposition to enhanced 
“The ROK government’s sense of 
space insecurity resulted in the  
10-year space security plan that 
will have important implications 
for legal and institutional 
frameworks, budgets and resource 
allocation, and the U.S.-ROK 
alliance relationship.”
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U.S.-led missile defense in Northeast Asia. The ROK is planning to 
deploy its Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) system, but so 
far the government has expressed ambivalence towards the U.S. 
deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) 
missiles even though such a deployment could be critical for the 
U.S. fulfilling its alliance commitments in the case of a military 
conflict breaking out on the Korean Peninsula.128
The third dimension of the ROK’s space security plan is related to 
the potential damage from solar flares that emit large amounts of 
electromagnetic pulses sufficient to damage satellite electronics 
and electrical systems, and in extreme cases, electronics and 
electrical systems on earth. To monitor and assess the risks of 
damage from increases in dangerous solar energy pulses, the 
ROK seeks to deploy sensors such as the GEO-Kompsat-2A in 
geosynchronous orbit, and acquire or develop the necessary 
software, human resources, and systems to provide analysis and 
early warning of the risks.129
International Cooperation
James Clay Moltz writes that a space race is underway in Asia, 
but that the prospects for rivalry, competition, conflict, or 
cooperation are uncertain.130 Moltz correctly ascertains that 
regional relations regarding outer space issues are a “subset 
of broader political, economic, and strategic relations within 
Asia.”131 Regional relations are characterized by what President 
Park calls “the Asian paradox.” Regional trade, investment, 
and product supply chains have resulted in East Asia becoming 
more integrated economically than Europe. The economic 
interdependence literature seems irrelevant as territorial 
issues, historical legacies, and rising nationalism all contribute 
to underlying tensions despite the absence of war. Several 
countries in the region are now democracies or transitioning to 
democracy: the Republic of Korea, Japan, the Republic of China 
(Taiwan), India, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Burma. However, 
it seems that the “democratic peace” hypothesis could be facing 
hard tests in the region, and if the hypothesis is rejected, rivalry 
or conflict between regional democracies could spill over into 
their outer space activities.
The Republic of Korea is bound by international treaties and 
domestic law to confine its space activities to “peaceful” 
endeavors. However, the regional space race is characterized by 
strategic interaction—no single actor has complete control over 
outcomes. Seoul’s actions will be influenced by the actions of 
others, especially the U.S., Russia, China, India, Japan, and the EU. 
If the outer space commons becomes militarized, the ROK will 
have no choice but to follow suit. Furthermore, we should expect 
the ROK to implement strong countermeasures to DPRK space-
based threats, whatever the potential ROK targets might be.
We cannot assume that space rivalry, competition, and conflict 
are inevitable in Asia; the gains from cooperation create strong 
incentives to avoid negative and costly outcomes. However, 
negative outcomes cannot be ruled out. If Asia’s space-faring 
fail to cooperate, all of their space assets will be at risk of being 
degraded or lost. There would be no winners, and even though 
the ROK has fewer space assets than other space powers, the 
ROK is in a weaker position to run an antagonistic space race 
compared to some of its Asian neighbors. Therefore, the ROK 
has tried to remain neutral when the big space powers—the 
U.S., Russia, and China—have been deadlocked over issues of 
governance and arms control in space.132 In other words, Seoul 
seeks to influence the big space powers to exercise restraint and 
avoid rivalry and conflict in space.
A cooperative environment is necessary for the ROK to pursue 
its international cooperation goals that will greatly influence 
the trajectory of the ROK program. KARI and other Korean 
entities in government, research institutions, and the private 
sector seek international cooperation for mutual goals but also 
for technology transfers in support of import substitution and 
greater autonomy. However, it can be difficult to balance these 
goals since they can be incompatible at times. The ROK’s long-
term strategy is to provide space-based data and contribute to 
international public goods in the realms of disaster relief, search 
and rescue operations, environmental protection and resource 
management. An example of this strategy is Seoul’s participation 
in the Sentinel Asia and the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency 
Forum (APRSAF). However, strategic considerations have led the 
ROK to decline participations and membership in the China-led 
Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO).133 Beijing 
has encouraged Seoul to join APSCO, and although the ROK could 
benefit from membership, the potential costs are perceived 
to be greater than the benefits since NASA, JAXA, and the ESA 
probably would be less willing to cooperate with KARI if the ROK 
embraced APSCO.134
The ROK seeks greater space cooperation with the U.S., but 
Washington’s long-term proliferation interests have been an 
obstacle. The past U.S. policy has been neither to obstruct nor 
to encourage the advancement of the ROK space program. This 
approach probably was appropriate and arguably was successful 
in underlining Washington’s nonproliferation objectives. 
However, the U.S. position will become more difficult to justify 
and support as the ROK space program becomes more advanced. 
The ROK is a treaty ally and close strategic partner. Space assets 
and technologies have multiple dual-use applications that 
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can be utilized to further U.S.-ROK bilateral interests. The U.S. 
policymaking process is complicated by the fact that its space 
policy is a complicated and technical issue area, and there are 
divergent views and interests across the American domestic 
political landscape, which is alien to ROK space specialists. This 
means that in the realm of space cooperation, the bilateral 
relationship likely will face more friction in the coming years 
before greater cooperation can be achieved.
Conclusion
The ROK is a signatory to all of the major international space 
treaties and ROK domestic law stipulates that space development 
must be for peaceful purposes. Seoul also is in compliance with 
its export control commitments to prevent the illicit transfer of 
missile systems, components and technologies. Over the last 
25 years, the ROK has made impressive progress in the realm 
of satellites and satellite applications. The development of 
space launch vehicles came later, and in January 2013, the ROK 
launched its first satellite into space with a ROK rocket.
The Naro-1 was made with Russian technical assistance, but 
now KARI is developing the KSLV-II, and indigenous SLV with 
greater launch capability. The Naro Space Center is in the final 
stages of an expansion program to support the development and 
launching of the KSLV-II. The KSLV-II will be capable of launching 
larger payloads into earth orbit as well as lunar probes. The 
ROK seeks to enter the international market for launch services 
in the next decade before embarking on the development of 
third generation and fourth generation SLVs, which will have the 
capacity to launch deep space probes.
The ROK currently has no concrete plan for manned space 
flights, but will revisit the issue in the coming years. Over the 
next decade, the ROK space program will focus on creating and 
expanding public access to new satellite data and applications. 
To protect its space-based assets and territory from space-based 
threats, the ROK also has an ambitious plan to deploy advanced 
tracking and detection systems to provide early warning.
Finally, the ROK seeks international cooperation to achieve 
common goals in space, and to acquire foreign technologies to 
advance ROK space capabilities. However, many countries and 
firms are either restricted or reluctant to share sensitive space 
technologies, so the depth and pace of international cooperation 
might not meet Seoul’s expectations or desires. The future 
of space in Asia is uncertain. Although unlikely, intense rivalry 
among the ROK and its neighbors could obstruct Seoul’s plans for 
peaceful cooperation in space.
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